IN RECENT YEARS, ECONOMISTS have intensely debated the appropriate degree of activism in fiscal-monetary policy making. The "new economics" of the 1960s emphasized activism, particularly in fiscal policy, relying "less on the automatic stabilizers and more on discretionary action responding to observed and forecast changes in the economy-less on rules and more on men."l When the economy's performance deteriorated after 1965, the activism of the policy strategy came under attack. In particular, the dissatisfaction led to a renewed espousal of rules for policy such as had long been advocated by Milton Friedman for monetary policy and by Herbert Stein for fiscal policy. 2 The critics of activism argue that changes in fiscal and monetary instruments designed to narrow deviations of the economy from a target path are likely to widen them instead, whereas the maintenance of appropriate fixed instrument settings would achieve greater economic stability. Specifically, the critics question the contribution of fiscal activism to the success story of the early sixties and emphasize that economic performance was * I am indebted to Robert E. Litan for assistance in the research, and to George Jaszi and several of the senior advisers and members of the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity for helpful comments. This paper covers the same basic issue of activism versus rules, but it seeks to identify the analytical issues in the debate and to relate them to an important theoretical literature on decision strategy in policy making. I shall appraise the case against activism, which is a set of several related, and yet separate, charges. A selection of quotes from the critics may illustrate these charges. Milton Friedman points out the limitations in our 'ability to predict both the behavior of the system in the absence of action and the effect of action" and the time-consuming process of correcting deviations which involves three types of lags: "(1) the lag between the need for action and the recognition of this need; (2) the lag between recognition of the need for action and the taking of action; and (3) the lag between the action and its effects."5 Beryl Sprinkel stresses the inherent stability of the private economy: "An activist monetary-fiscal policy is quite likely to destabilize an inherently stable economy . . . 6 One way it could do so is by disrupting private economic planning, as President Nixon has noted: "Business and labor cannot plan, and consumers and homebuyers cannot effectively According to another strand of the argument, the political process is irrational or inefficient. The Council of Economic Advisers contends: "A policy of ad hoc decisions about deficits or surplus is exposed to the political bias in favor of spending and deficits."8 Similarly, Friedman posits a "propensity to overreact" by the monetary authorities stemming from their "failure ... to allow for the delay between their actions and the subsequent effects on the economy."9
any fiscal-monetary actions. The perfect foresight should extend over the period during which the instruments would exert their effects on the economy; but such dynamic issues can be conveniently assumed away by pretending either that the world is static in the sense of being timeless or else that it contains only a single time period with no relevant horizon beyond. Second, achieving an ideal level of GNP should be the only concern of the policy maker. Third, he must be able to control his instruments precisely, with no costs imposed in setting or changing them. Finally, the instruments must be sufficiently potent to keep GNP on target regardless of the past and present strength of private demand.
Under such conditions, the right amount of action could always be calculated and implemented. If some initial setting of the fiscal-monetary instrument would produce a GNP differing from the target level, the policy maker would divide the deviation or "gap" (D) by the known multiplier (k) on his tax, expenditure, money, or interest rate instrument, in order to determine the correct change in the policy instrument (AP): AP = -D/k.
Such is the activist's paradise, and like any paradise, it is distant from reality.
THE RULE PROPONENT'S MODEL WORLD
No proponent of rules has specified the assumptions that would make fixed settings optimal. Of course, the rules proponent emphasizes that paradise does not exist and that we will be worse off if we act as though it did. But fixed fiscal-monetary settings are not the only alternative to the strategy of the activist's paradise. Indeed, the world in which they would be optimal is not really the polar opposite of the activist's paradise. For example, under conditions of complete ignorance, as contrasted with the perfect foresight of the activist's paradise, the instruments would appear to be unrelated to economic activity and no presumption would be created in favor of keeping them steady.
The optimality of fixed settings depends on a set of assumptions that might run along the following lines: First, private demand is inherently stable. In the absence of shifts in policy, it would tend toward some equilibrium path; that path would be optimal, at least for some settings of the fiscal-monetary instruments; and deviations from that path would disappear promptly. Second, long-run relationships between fiscal-monetary policies and private demand must be known reliably so that proper settings can be determined. Third, the short-run impacts of the instruments must be subject to substantial uncertainty so that it will not pay to change the settings temporarily. Finally, the policy maker is able to maintain the fixed settings without cost. Under such a set of assumptions, changing policies could produce only trivial stabilization benefits and might impose large costs.
The central portion of this paper relaxes, one at a time, the key assumptions of the activist's paradise, and thus introduces a number of complexities of the real world that are emphasized by the proponents of rules. I then examine the resulting implications for the optimum conduct of fiscal-monetary policy and in particular the extent to which they point in the direction of fixed settings. Although at times I focus the analysis on the assumptions of the rule proponent's model world, I carry out that exercise much less thoroughly, simply because I have not found a neat package of sufficient conditions for that world. The resulting asymmetry troubles me on esthetic grounds, but I believe it reflects the spirit of the recent debate rather than my personal judgments. The rules proponents have stressed the pitfalls of activism rather than the glories of fixed settings; their case for rules is, by and large, the case against departing from them.
Instrument Costs INSTRUMENTS AND MULTIPLE TARGETS
In stating sufficient conditions for the activist's paradise, I assumed that the policy maker is concerned only with the stabilization goal. Obviously, many other goals of economic policy are important. But paradise could, in principle, exist with multiple goals, so long as the available instruments were sufficient in number and in potency to achieve them all. Consider, for example, the social goal of income distribution: Society might have both the income distribution it wants and the aggregate activity it wants, providing the structure of taxes, transfer payments, and subsidies could be adjusted to alter income distribution without affecting aggregate demand and supply.
As Tinbergen has shown, a necessary condition for the reliable achievement of multiple goals is that the number of instruments be equal to the number of targets." When, however, the number of instruments is smaller than the number of targets, paradise is supplanted by a world of tough compromises, which have been discussed analytically by Henri Theil.12 If a stabilization instrument had no significant effect on any other social target, that instrument could be devoted singlemindedly to the stabilization effort. And if it were sufficiently potent, the activist's paradise for stabilization policy might still be salvaged. Obviously, however, every stabilization instrument does have significant side effects on such social goal variables as resource allocation, the composition of output, the balance of payments, the growth of productive capacity, and wealth. So long as society cannot hit the bull's eye on all its targets, and so long as some departure from any fiscal-monetary policy that is ideal for the stabilization goal would permit closer approaches to other targets, stabilization must be compromised, in general. For example, if the only available ways to restrain excess demand would involve either a level of government expenditures below the social target for the public sector or a level of real interest rates too high for the ideal composition of output, the optimal compromise would typically involve some undesired inflation, as well as a level of public spending below its ideal and a level of real interest rates above the ideal. 13 The division of output between the public and the private sectors embodies controversial social preferences that often constrain or shape the course of stabilization policy. If government expenditures are the key instrument of demand management, the level of public spending ideal for achieving target GNP may not be ideal for providing the desired flow of public goods and services. Indeed, political controversy about stabilization policy often combines or confuses stabilization and compositional objectives. Proponents of a larger public sector sometimes seize the opportunities presented by economic slack to promote their compositional objective, while advocates of cutbacks in government spending may enthusiastically embrace an anti-inflation rationale to serve their cause. Because they avoid this problem and controversy, general, across-theboard changes in income tax rates were a particularly appealing countercyclical tool in the eyes of the Commission on Money and Credit14 and the economists of the Kennedy administration. In my judgment they continue to be appealing. Most recently, the efficacy of temporary changes in income tax rates has been challenged on the basis of the permanent income hypothesis, but, as I have argued previously, this charge is inconsistent with a substantial body of empirical evidence.15 Of course, both permanent and temporary changes in income tax rates impinge on other social goals, such as the market valuation of wealth, the efficiency of resource allocation, and (typically) income distribution and output composition. Still, these impacts seem less significant than those generally associated with other instruments of stabilization policy.
J. Tinbergen, Oni the Theory of Economic
Several types of serious conflicts with other goals may arise from monetary policy actions that could help stabilize economic activity. These issues become especially important in periods of tight money because losses in the market valuation of wealth impose a welfare cost, because rises in nominal interest rates redistribute income, and because tight money has a severe impact on the share of output devoted to homebuilding. These side effects of tight money explain why the 1966 performance of the Federal Reservewhich was magnificent in terms of overall stabilization-is held in such ill repute and why the Federal Reserve refused to give an encore in late 1967 and early 1968. 16 The side effects thus argue against an activist reliance on tight money to curb excess demand. But they also argue against quantity-oriented rules. Even if monetary policy affects GNP solely through the quantity of money, it clearly affects nonstabilization targets through both nominal and real interest rates and through the availability of credit. Obviously, steady money growth does not prevent rising interest rates if liquidity preference strengthens or if aggregate demand spurts because of a highly stimulative fiscal policy or an ebullient private economy. 
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perienced with a monetary policy oriented toward rates. As Fand points out, when the monetary authorities initially accommodate an excess demand inflation because they dislike high interest rates, they may subsequently have to resort to especially high nominal interest rates (reflecting inflation premiums) in order to achieve the stabilization task.17 Such an argument charges the policy makers with myopia. It cannot deny that an optimal rational strategy aimed at stabilizing interest rates should pay some attention to the course of interest rates as one of the proximate targets even if a quantity-oriented strategy is best for stabilizing GNP. How much weight should be given to interest stability as a social target'8 and how variable money growth would have to be for that reason are issues that deserve greater attention and more sharply focused discussion. But it should be clear that quantity-oriented monetary rules conflict with nonstabilization targets.
In summary, the effects of stabilization instruments on other social targets generally imply deviations from the activist's paradise. These considerations should have a major influence on the selection and mixture of instruments, and they can also affect the desirable magnitude of restraint or stimulus. Probably, a fiscal policy geared to long-run considerations about tax structure and demands for collective services can satisfy nonstabilization targets reasonably well; hence, any major departure from the rules proponent's fiscal strategy imposes some costs in compromising those other goals.19 But if the choice of fiscal instruments for stabilization use is adjusted to reflect these considerations, the costs should not be onerous. In the case of monetary policy, the costs of compromising nonstabilization targets may be especially large if an activist strategy were to rely mainly on tight money to restrain excess demand. But they may also be sizable when monetary policy follows a rule that ignores the social preference for interest rate stability.
In short, because of the multiple targets of the real world, the policy maker may be led to trim his fiscal actions somewhat at times in the direc- 
COSTS OF CHANGING POLICIES
In addition to the possible costs of operating stabilization instruments at levels that compromise other goals, certain costs may be associated with changing the settings of the instruments.
The costs of change have a number of dimensions. Shifts in fiscal policies may impair the efficiency of the public sector. For example, a stabilization strategy that turns on and off federal programs involving purchases of goods and services may create inefficiencies or impose extra costs in carrying out the objectives of the programs.
Since time on the congressional calendar is a scarce resource, the legislative process to implement fiscal measures imposes some cost. That cost will be most significant for tax and transfer changes, since Congress reviews most federal purchases and grants as a matter of routine each year in the appropriations process, but reconsiders the laws for taxes and transfer payments only in the event of proposals for alterations. Moreover, the legislative cost of enactment of a tax or transfer change has little to do with its size and is primarily a fixed or "set-up" cost. In the case of a small program that would otherwise be desirable, legislative cost may tip the balance from a "go" to a "no-go" decision.
Tax changes can also impose costs on private decision makers.20 A major change in the tax base will surely cause reappraisals of business policies and may require considerable efforts to learn the new rules of the game. Moreover, if taxes are restructured frequently for stabilization purposes, uncertainty about the tax laws will regularly cast a shadow on private decision making.
These considerations seem most serious in the case of tax changes that introduce incentives for the intertemporal shifting of outlays, like countercyclical variations in the investment tax credit or in excise taxes. Such measures are appealing because of their presumably enlarged m-ultiplier impact, with substitution effects reinforcing the normal income effects of 20. In order to cover all aspects of changing settings, the next several paragraphs allow uncertainty to creep in, even though the perfect foresight assumption of activist's paradise has not been explicitly abandoned. a tax rate change; the required dollar change in the instrument settings for any given stimulus or restraint is thereby made smaller. But the anticipatory effects of such practices are destabilizing-for example, a slowdown in investment outlays is exacerbated if a weakening of the economy makes a temporary rise in the tax credit seem likely. A commitment to retroactivity can ameliorate the problem for a tax reduction, but, for a tax rise, retroactivity is universally rejected as inequitable.21
Changes in income tax rates seem less subject to such problems. Anticipatory effects on spending decisions tend to be stabilizing: The expectation of a cut in rates will, if anything, spur outlays. Of course, the enactment of changes in tax rates will alter spending and hiring decisions; that cost is inevitable for any policy that successfully influences private demand. Some distortion of year-end accounting decisions is another adverse, but basically negligible, cost of changing tax rates.
In general, guessing what the government will do next involves expensive effort on the part of executives throughout the private sector, and this fact imposes costs on shifts in fiscal policies. But guessing where GNP is going absorbs even more private resources and creates even more serious anxieties. If the government can help to stabilize markets and incomes, it can reduce uncertainties rather than exacerbate them. Indeed, the statement of President Nixon quoted above can be reversed: If the government reliably alternates between pressing on the accelerator when the economy is going uphill and applying the brake pedal going downhill, it will aid private decision making.
In summary, the maintenance of a fiscal rule (combined with a stable composition of expenditures and taxes) would avoid certain costs of changing instrument settings that may be created by an activist fiscal policy. In particular, the set-up costs of legislation may swing the verdict in favor of inaction when a small tax or transfer change would be desirable on stabilization grounds alone. More generally, the costs of change have important implications for the choice of fiscal instruments, cautioning against great reliance on variations in government purchases and on those tax changes that generate intertemporal substitution. 
Uncertainty
The recognition of uncertainty in stabilization policy making marks another step away from the activist's paradise and toward reality. In place of perfect foresight, assume that the policy maker can make an unbiased forecast of GNP given his policy choices-his average error will be zero in the long run, but the average will consist of offsetting pluses and minuses.
Two types of uncertainty about the private economy can be distinguished: First, the policy maker cannot predict precisely the inherent strength of private demand (quite apart from his choice of fiscal-monetary policy); second, he cannot be certain of the response of GNP to the stabilization instruments. The interesting result is that the first type barely influences the optimal fiscal-monetary strategy, while the second imposes a major amendment. Still a third type of uncertainty reflects the imperfect ability of the policy maker to control the settings of his own fiscal-monetary instruments. These three types of uncertainty will be discussed in turn.
In a world of uncertainty, it becomes necessary to specify just how much the society (and presumably the policy maker) is hurt by deviations of actual GNP (Y) from the target (Y*). It is usual to assume that society is "risk averse," which means that, for example, doubling the deviation from the target more than doubles the pain or "welfare loss" For the present, assume that the reliability of the policy maker's forecast is independent of the setting of the instruments; in other words, the forecast is subject to the same additive or subtractive error in GNP, regardless of the policy chosen. This type of uncertainty may still leave the policy maker well advised to act as though his best forecast were a certain forecast, even though it is not.23
Given the simple quadratic loss function specified above, the optimum strategy to minimize expected welfare loss is to set policy instruments such that the predicted GNP (YP) for those settings equals the target GNP (YP = Y*). The squared deviations are minimized when the expected or mean distance from the target is made zero, in the sense that pluses and minuses cancel out.24 Since the policy maker should act as though he were certain of his forecast, his optimum strategy is one of "certainty equivalence." The existence of this type of uncertainty will make the outcome less satisfactory than in the activist's paradise (L cannot be kept down to zero); but the optimum strategy is still the one appropriate to the paradise situation. The more help the policy maker can get from accurate forecasting, the closer to his target he can expect to get. But greater uncertainty about the outlook does not diminish the premium on corrective action: Although it reduces the likelihood that policy action will keep the economy close to target, it increases the danger that inaction may result in a very large deviation from target. This result does not depend critically on the quadratic function. 24. This reflects the fact that the sum of squared deviations of all observations in a frequency distribution from any point is minimized when that point is the mean of the distribution. unlike these examples, society dislikes upward deviations from Y* more (or less) than downward deviations of equal size, the asymmetry will further modify the choice of the certainty equivalent, but it will not push the optimum strategy in the direction of rules. These results do depend on the availability of some unbiased forecast to the policy maker. The records of individual forecasters would not suggest that all are unbiased. Moreover, with an unbiased fiscal-monetary rule, a perennial forecast of no gap would be unbiased in the sense that it was as often too high as too low. But, whatever their limitations, professional forecasters can outperform the naive forecast that, regardless of (Y -Y*) this year, it will be zero next year.
With these few qualifications, imperfection in the ability to forecast economic activity in the absence of policy action has virtually no effect on the desirability of taking policy action.
MULTIPLIER UNCERTAINTIES
Uncertainties concerning the impacts of changes in policy instruments introduce far more important amendments. Contrary to the assumptions of the certainty equivalence case, the forecaster cannot predict GNP equally well (or equally badly) regardless of the settings of the insfruments. Forecasters would be terribly uncertain if asked to estimate next year's GNP on the assumption of a radical alteration in fiscal or monetary policy, such as a repeal of all income taxes or the doubling of the money supply.
William Brainard developed the analysis of multiplier uncertainties, which had been previously mentioned by Friedman.25 If the policy maker cannot be sure of the size of the multiplier associated with his policy instrument, then the greater the departure of that instrument from its average or customary setting, the greater will be the uncertainty about GNP. This formulation assumes that some particular setting of the instrument minimizes uncertainty about GNP.
In a static world, the minimum uncertainty position would be the average setting of the instrument during the historical sample period from which the multiplier was estimated, and would not necessarily be close to the most recent setting. In a world of growth, however, some estimates of the multiplier effects of instruments are derived from changes in settings over time. In such cases, the average historical change represents minimum uncertainty. Thus, the nature of the statistical evidence underlying the multiplier estimate determines whether minimum uncertainty is obtained at the average historical level or the average historical change. The issue can be important: Suppose the average full employment surplus through relevant history has been 1 percent of GNP and the average change has been zero; if the surplus is currently minus 1 percent of GNP, it is critical whether minimum uncertainty would be attained by staying at minus 1 percent or by moving to plus 1 percent.
Presumably the proponent of rules would recommend a full employment surplus that was not vastly different from the historical average; furthermore, his recommendation for no change in that surplus would closely correspond with the historical record which shows erratic ups and downs but little trend. Similarly, the proponent of monetary rules typically espouses a rate of growth of money and liquidity that is quite close to the historical average, as well as levels that are fairly customary in relation to GNP. In that sense, obedience to the rules would keep the instruments close to minimum uncertainty and finesse the problem of multiplier uncertainty.
In the case of an activist strategy, if a policy action to make YP equal to Y* required a major departure of the instrument from its setting of minimum uncertainty, that action would make the prediction of GNP less reliable. Compared with keeping the instrument at minimum uncertainty, the activist strategy will gain (or reduce loss) by closing the expected gap between Y and Y*, but will lose from the multiplier uncertainty, which is applied to the distance of the instrument setting from its minimum uncertainty position. The added risk associated with multiplier uncertainty is costly whenever society is risk averse. If the policy maker starts with instruments at settings of minimum uncertainty, he is advised to exercise conservatism in his use of the instruments, always taking some action but a smaller action than would equate expected and target GNP. As Brainard shows, in the case of a quadratic loss function, one instrument, and independence of the uncertainty concerning the multiplier from that associated with the basic state of private demand, the optimum prescription is to close the fraction of the expected gap equal to 1/(1 + V2) where V is the ratio of the standard deviation of the estimate of the multiplier to the expected value of the multiplier.26 For example, if the standard error is half the estimated multiplier, closing four-fifths of the gap is optimal.
Diversification. One interesting implication of multiplier uncertainty is that it encourages the use of a diversified kit of instruments. The individual instruments are generally put to work in the same direction of stimulus or restraint:27 Because variance increases with the square of the instrument move, two smaller moves that operate in the same direction economize on variance, so long as the errors in the two multiplier estimates are not strongly positively correlated. To the extent that errors in the estimated impacts of tax, expenditure, and monetary changes are not perfectly correlated, optimum use of a diversified kit of instruments yields two kinds of benefits: a reduction in risk, and a reduction in the expected gap between Y and Y*. When the policy maker chooses combined packages of restrictive (or stimulative) tools, the benefits and costs of any policy should be viewed as a characteristic of the package rather than of its individual components. That implication should be recognized in analytical efforts to appraise the fiscal and monetary impacts of combined actions, such as the tax cut and monetary accommodation of 1964-65.
With respect to monetary policy, the interpretation of multiplier uncertainty depends on whether the money supply or interest rates is designated the instrument. The criteria for this choice, which have been spelled out by Poole,28 can be described in terms of multiplier uncertainty. Presumably, the same expected GNP can be obtained by picking an interest rate or picking a money supply. The reason that one of these choices can be preferable to the other on stabilization grounds is that the variance of GNP around that expected value will be smaller with the money instrument if the liquidity preference function is highly stable, or smaller with the interest rate instrument if the consumption and investment demand functions are very stable. The choice of the "superior" instrument promotes greater activism, leading the policy maker to aim at closing more of any expected GNP gap.
In summary, a rule for steady money growth could avoid multiplier uncertainty if it aimed to maintain the historical average. Similarly, a fiscal rule that specified constancy of the high employment budget surplus could also escape multiplier uncertainty.29 Multiplier uncertainty upsets the pleasant and appealing solution of the certainty-equivalence world. It typically reduces the appropriate degree of activism, urging the policy maker to take a step in the direction of the proponent of rules. But the step is generally a small one; the policy maker will generally wish to take action when any expected deviation between actual and target GNP is in prospect, and usually enough action to close the greater part of any expected gap. Moreover, as I shall show below, if the uncertainty about GNP stemming from policy actions can be made to neutralize uncertainties about the course of private demand, policy action can reduce total uncertainty as well as improve the expected outcome. Indeed, the major import of multiplier uncertainty may be its encouragement to the policy maker to design, select, and combine instruments in ways that permit the pursuit of target GNP without major vulnerability to variance.
Finally, the important amendments imposed by multiplier uncertainty do not disturb one part of the certainty-equivalence solution: The optimal strategy depends only on the policy maker's ability to forecast the incremental impacts of policy actions, and not on the accuracy of his forecast of demand for a given fiscal-monetary policy.30 Dynamic multipliers. Multiplier impacts and uncertainties have impor-29. To do so, fiscal policy must also stabilize the composition of outlays and the structure of tax revenues in order to avoid multiplier uncertainties that are attached to the movement of various types of expenditures and taxes.
30. In "Adaptive Decision Rules for Macroeconomic Planninig," Westernl Economic Joiurn-al, Vol. 9 (December 1971), pp. 369-78, Edward C. Prescott introduces a "learning by doing" consideration into policy formulation. He points out that a large shift of the instrument from its historical average movement provides substantial additional information about its multiplier. The value of that extra information for future policy making should encourage larger actions than the Brainard model would imply, although typically not as large as would be appropriate in the activist's paradise. tant dynamic aspects, because the effect of a policy action on aggregate demand is spread out over time. A federal expenditure or an increment in money supply occurring in one quarter is likely to raise aggregate demand then and in several subsequent quarters. In particular, the profile of period multipliers, as statistically estimated, is often humped, starting small, rising to a peak, then declining, and perhaps ultimately becoming negative: Instrument instability raises a new threat to the activist's paradise. It suggests that, even with no multiplier uncertainties and no instrument costs, a policy of eliminating all gaps might not be sustainable over the long run because the required instrument settings might diverge toward plus or minus infinity. This analysis makes an important contribution; but, because it is framed in a deterministic way and in the context of an infinite horizon, its real relevance may be obscured. The analysis draws a mathematical boundary line between stability (damped oscillations) and instability (antidamped oscillations), seeming to imply that the former region is perfectly safe and the latter necessarily perilous. In fact, if shifts of the instruments had no costs or constraints, instrument instability and the specter of infinity would not frighten the policy maker. After all, the instruments would take on infinite values only after an infinite length of time. Secondly, the analysis focuses on "blips" or wiggles in economic activityone-period deviations that are self-correcting. As discussed below, these are not the typical movements that challenge the policy maker. Moreover, the humped pattern of dynamic multipliers reflects the quarterly time periods of the available data. The policy maker can remove the danger of instrument instability simply by selecting a somewhat longer planning period-for any empirical example I know, nine-month periods would make k1 the peak value of the period multiplier.
On the other hand, the analysis of instrument instability points to the general problems of dealing with dynamic multiplier profiles, even if they satisfy the mathematical stability conditions. Wide swings in the instruments may still entail large costs as a result of the considerations discussed above: the effects on nonstabilization targets, the costs of changing settings, and, most significantly, the Brainard multiplier uncertainties.32 Indeed, the policy maker conscious of multiplier uncertainties will avoid strategies that would permit instrument instability to become a serious threat. In the first place, any strategy that relies on wide swings of instruments will be charged heavily for creating additional variance. (The strategy of expected full adjustment in the appendix illustrates the costs of superfine tuning.) Second, statistical estimates will remind the alert policy maker of the major uncertainties he faces with respect to the time pattern of dynamic multipliers. The estimated standard error of the multiplier on an instrument is smaller for, say, four quarters, than for a single quarter. In light of these facts of economic life, the policy maker will plan over a horizon of several quarters and will be reluctant to chase transitory gaps. Only if he has confidence that the economy needs a major push initially will he adopt a stimulative policy today recognizing that it will probably require a neutralizing restraining action on some tomorrow. Such a strategy-which has been derisively called "oversteering"-generally imposes some instrument costs and some added multiplier uncertainty; but it can be worth those costs at times if it helps significantly to keep Y close to P. 32. Nor are the mathematical stability conditions sufficient reassurance when instruments have "natural" floors or ceilings, such as the constraints that government purchases must lie between zero and total GNP and that the money supply and the rate of interest are intrinsically nonnegative. Furthermore, nonlinearities may limit the effectiveness of the instruments; for example, in vertical or horizontal stretches of liquidity preference or marginal efficiency schedules, either fiscal or monetary tools would be incapable of affecting the economy, at least in one direction. Thus, in principle as well as in practice, monetary rules are bound to be framed in terms of an instrument subject to only imperfect control. For that reason, the rules proponent is obliged to instruct the policy maker how to respond to errors or deviations in the instrument. If last month's money stock departed from its target, what adjustment is required for the target money stock this month? Surely, it cannot be optimal to maintain the initially intended target growth rate and thus to permit the level of the money stock to be permanently off track, as the emphasis solely on the rate of growth seems to imply.
Fiscal policy. Instrument uncertainty poses a different set of problems for the proponent of fiscal rules. The fiscal policy maker in the executive branch is exposed to many risks that may derail the budget, including unanticipated changes in military spending and other uncontrollable outlays, or congressional action inconsistent with the administration program. When the fiscal policy maker who espouses rules is thus surprised or thwarted, he must take some new action in order to live by his own rules. Maintaining a given high employment surplus or a fixed position of any other fiscal indicator does not afford the policy maker a quiet life of inaction, but rather obliges him to take neutralizing action whenever the budget wanders off its track.
Obviously, in practice, the rules proponent will not chase every small deviation in the budget; but his own principles require him to respond to major instrument deviations, when he would not respond to surprises of the same magnitude in private demand. If this asymmetry has a justification, I have yet to discover it. The neutralizing action in response to an instrument surprise involves the same types of instrument costs and the same degree of multiplier uncertainty that apply to fiscal actions intended to offset shortfalls or excesses of private demand.
Instrument uncertainty is also a serious problem for the fiscal activist, who may often require prompt legislative approval of proposals. In view of the legislative uncertainties in fiscal policy, any monetary instrument is probably subject to greater short-run control and predictability than are fiscal variables. Hence, instrument uncertainty is one consideration that encourages the activist to alter monetary policy, Some activists have faced up to the problems of instrument uncertaintyfor example, by proposing mechanisms that would increase the speed of congressional verdicts on tax proposals. The rules proponents, on the other hand, have ducked these important issues, in my judgment. No advocate of fiscal rules has explained how the commitment to respond to instrument deviations can be consistent with a uniform nonresponse to demand deviations. And no proponent of monetary rules has suggested procedures for dealing with situations when money goes off its track.
The Issue of Self-correction
Although the rules proponent recognizes that private demand will fluctuate to some extent even if the monetary and fiscal rules are carefully obeyed, he views the economy as inherently stable in two senses: First, departures from a reasonable target path are likely to be small unless policy is disruptive; second, GNP will tend to return promptly to its ideal path if it should wander somewhat off course. So far as I can see, the first of these propositions is not relevant to the formulation of a strategy by the policy maker on how he should respond to departures, when and if they occur. By analogy, the fireman must know what to do when the alarm rings, whether that happens frequently or hardly ever.
The second proposition is, however, very important. It urges the policy maker not to respond to deviations, but rather to rely on snapback or selfcorrective tendencies that prevail if monetary policy sticks to its fixed setting (M*) and fiscal policy to its rule (F*). A strong self-correction hypothesis might contend that, given M* and F*, the expected value of real GNP for any period beyond some horizon h is equal to Y* regardless of Y in the last observed period, where h is small relative to the time period of dynamic multipliers on fiscal-monetary instruments. This can be stated as follows: (weakness) is also observed in the next quarter. Some econometric models build in explicit correcting mechanisms, using the errors of recent quarters as explanatory variables; others do so less explicitly by using lagged consumption (for example) as an explanatory variable for current consumption. In either case, an initial overshoot of demand leads automatically to an upward adjustment of predictions.
Even if an initial deviation in the strength of demand was only a transitory "blip," the multiplier-accelerator process would produce persistent deviations from the initially expected path. An upward deviation would generate extra income and output that would, in turn, increase aggregate demand in subsequent periods. A higher GNP means a higher disposable income, and hence adds to next period's consumption; extra final demands also add to next period's demand for inventory and fixed investment.
This multiplier-accelerator process is the reason for the lagged impact of fiscal actions on GNP as well as the persisting impact of deviations in private demand. The time periods of the two dynamic processes are bound to be essentially the same. The dynamic multiplier on fiscally generated disposable income and that on privately generated income to the same recipients will have the same time profile. Recognition of this dual nature of lags changes the basic view of the dynamics of stabilization policy. Lags in the effects of fiscal-monetary tools are often cursed for hampering the effectiveness of policy. But these are the same lags that apply to the effects of shifts in private demand and generate the cumulative character of economic fluctuations. From that point of view, the lags are blessings that permit the policy maker to take the stitch in time.
Thus the evidence of both Keynesian and monetarist models of economic activity suggests that we live in an economy of persistence, rather than self-correction.40 If GNP moves either above or below its target path, it tends to stay on that side of the path long enough to permit corrective assistance from prompt policy action. To appreciate the way activism may reduce risk, consider an initially blissful situation in which expected GNP (YP) is equal to Y* at the minimum uncertainty settings of the instruments, which happen to be precisely the settings espoused by rule proponents. Then the activist and the rules proponent have no disagreement, and no sacrifice is needed to hold down multiplier uncertainty. Suppose further that, in this world, business investment outlays and government purchases have an identical-although not reliably known-dynamic multiplier effect on Y. Finally, suppose that a survey of business investment plans provides an excellent forecast of that component for at least one quarter in advance.
On these assumptions, any downward surprise in business investment plans should be offset dollar for dollar by an increase in government purchases over and above the path called for by fiscal rules. Given reliable information that investment is below the initial forecast, inaction would not only leave YP below Y* but would also permit increased multiplier uncertainty on the impact of the shortfall in investment. Because the same unknown multiplier will go to work in an upward direction on the additional government purchases and in a downward direction on the shortfall in business investment, it is possible, in this case, to hedge perfectly and neutralize the surprise in private demand.
Obviously, these assumptions are extreme; but the point remains qualitatively valid even if the multipliers are not identical, if the forecast of private spending is not perfect, and if the government action cannot be perfectly synchronized in time. For one example of an imperfect offset, suppose that tax cuts are the only available fiscal instrument. If, as a result of a shortfall of private investment equal to S, private disposable income would be cut by, say, O.6S, a general tax cut of 0.6S would eliminate the income effects of the shortfall. The initial drop in output could have continuing accelerator effects, but that part of the multiplier process stemming from induced income losses would be neutralized effectively. Again, as compared with inaction, the outcome would mean a smaller expected gap and less variance around the expected GNP.
In the partial neutralization provided by such a tax cut, discretionary policy reinforces the automatic fiscal stabilizers. Automatic changes in tax revenues and transfer benefits offset 0.4 of the potential income loss; a cut in taxes that neutralizes the remaining 0.6 ratio per dollar deviation in GNP brings the expected net impact on private disposable income down to zero, just as though the automatic stabilizers provided a full offset.4' From the point of view of stabilization policy, it could be highly desirable for automatic stabilizers to provide the entire offset to the private income loss (or gain) stemming from an initial deviation in demand. But they cannot be designed to approach that magnitude for nonstabilization reasons: Neither marginal tax rates nor income replacement ratios under transfer programs are ever near 100 percent, because such rates would have extremely adverse effects on incentives.
If the policy maker can respond to surprises in demand only after they have occurred, he still has considerable opportunity to hedge as well as improve the expected outcome. Suppose the shortfall in private investment uncertain multiplier pattern associated with that policy will work to offset, at least in part, the similarly uncertain multiplier effects of the initial deviation in demand.42
IMPLICATIONS OF MONETARISM
The most ardent and articulate exponents of monetary rules-led by Milton Friedman-are also "monetarists," believing that changes in the money supply are the key force determining changes in nominal GNP. Although the personalities advocating them may be identical, the propositions are distinct.43 As David Fand has pointed out, a monetarist tradition that prevailed in the 1920s was quite activist in its thrust.44 As should be clear from the discussion above concerning persistence versus self-correction in the income velocity of money, a monetarist who believes that velocity surprises persist would wish to deviate from a path of steady monetary growth when Y departs from Y*.
I should like to illustrate the activist implications of one monetarist view by reference to econometric studies of money-income relations made by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, focusing on them because they represent the most thorough and carefully articulated quantification of the monetarist view.45 According to the St. Louis model, price flexibility works very slowly to restore equilibrium, with a process of adjustment that lasts for many years. On the other hand, the dynamic multiplier effect of money on nominal GNP is estimated to be complete over a period of four quarters. Moreover, the standard errors on the estimated multiplier coefficients are consistently fairly small. Finally, as noted above, the GNP equation implies that any observed deviation of the income velocity of money from its expected level should be viewed as permanent.
The same argument reveals that responding to deviations in fiscal instruments
need not add significantly to multiplier uncertainty; if, for example, a rejected tax hike is replaced by a proposed transfer cut, the multiplier pattern can be counted on to be similar. But this sauce for the instrument-surprise goose is also sauce for the demandsurprise gander. The results demonstrate that he should not keep monetary growth steady, but rather should step it up when GNP falls below the target path and reduce it when GNP exceeds the target. This finding also illustrates a general principle: Any claim of reliable knowledge about the effect of a policy instrument on economic activity is likely to imply some prescription for the use of that instrument. For all but the most strained assumptions, anyone who believes that a dollar of extra money reliably produces, say, five dollars of extra GNP is obliged to favor the creation of additional money when more GNP is desired.
The approximate optimization of the St. Louis model suggests that monetary policy should create a negative feedback of the recent strength of GNP (relative to target) on the money supply rather than the independence sought by the rule. It is, however, often contended that actual Federal Reserve policy tends to produce positive feedback by accommodating, at least in part, changes in the demand for money stemming from changes in economic activity.
It is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to determine the nature of the feedback in past or current Federal Reserve policy. Supporting the charge of positive feedback is circumstantial evidence that the growth of money has been especially slow during recession periods. On the other hand, it has been particularly rapid during the initial phase of cyclical expansions, when the desired growth of real GNP was presumably large. In any case, the analytical conclusion that a monetary policy that produced positive feedback from (Y -Y*) onto M might be on the "wrong side" of the rule is not solely monetarist. On a Keynesian view of the causal process running from M to Y, a monetary policy that accommodates increases in the demand for money stemming from shifts in liquidity preference helps to stabilize income and interest rates. On the other hand, if it accommodates increases in the demand for money stemming from higher levels of economic activity (and consequently increased transactions requirements), it thereby weakens the automatically stabilizing impact of higher economic activity in raising interest rates. Similarly, an inappropriate incentive system might make the mixed strategy optimal for the policy maker when it was not optimal for the country. A high penalty on officials for errors of commission and a low one for errors of omission would bias choices toward a mixed strategy. If, for example, the policy maker waits until GNP is far below target (or below target for a long time) before taking stimulative action, he can be confident that his ultimate action is better than continued inaction. He will have reduced the chance of being penalized for an error of commission. Of course, by the time he acts, the nation would have paid heavily for the error of omission. Moreover, too late probably means too much: The shift in the instruments will probably have to be large, involving considerable multiplier uncertainty and substantial disturbance to private decision making. On many counts, a strategy that yields large and infrequent shifts seems inferior to a more continuous policy with small and frequent changes in the settings.
Actual policy making has resembled the mixed strategy at times in the past decade. At the start of the year in 1962 and again in 1971, the private economy was given a "last chance" to attain strong recovery momentum on its own, with little assistance from stimulative policy. Strikingly, in August of both years, when the shortfall persisted and it became clear that nature was not taking a curative course, President Kennedy and President Nixon, respectively, announced major stimulative shifts in policy. These incidents macroeconomic and the political aspects of the issues were carefully distinguished. The historical record surely demonstrates that we need better political procedures to safeguard economic stabilization objectives, but it does not reveal whether a set of rules would surmount political barriers any better than (or even as well as) an activist strategy.
The proponents of rules have not made clear how they are supposed to operate as constraints on the political process. No one suggests that fixed fiscal and monetary settings could or should be written into the Constitution, or even into statute, with penalties for violators. Rather, the Federal Reserve is being urged to impose on itself a constraint that would remove its subsequent opportunity to influence the key decision variables under its control. Similarly, the President and his agents are urged to impose the same self-restraint and self-denial by obeying a fiscal rule. One reason people impose rules on themselves is that they do not trust their own rationality. But this reason seems particularly inappropriate in the case at hand: If the nation's top public officials are irrational about their area of professional expertise, then the nation needs better officials rather than a confession of irrationality by the existing ones.51
In general, people also may impose rules on themselves to strengthen their bargaining positions against possible adversaries by delimiting their own options. The rules proposal may contain some elements of this strategy. Perhaps the Federal Reserve is being asked to announce unmistakably to the President and to the Congress that it will not help finance a reckless fiscal policy. Perhaps administration economic officials are being asked to draw a line that the Congress (and even the President) cannot cross.
In another sense, the economics profession and other informed observers of the economy are being asked to form a consensus in favor of rules that would impose discipline on federal policy making. If economists have power to persuade and mobilize public opinion, then they should use it to promote rational and timely policy adjustments instead of nonoptimal rules. Like the mice, we all wish to bell the cat; but is the promulgation of nondiscretionary rules really the way to put a resounding bell on him? 51. I find it puzzling and amusing that economists who rely most heavily on the rationality of consumers, workers, and businesses (for example, in denying the need for statutory information and safety requirements) attribute the most unsophisticated irrationality and myopia to federal policy makers. A related puzzle: Why are government decision makers often urged to "satisfice"-that is, aim for a satisfactory outcome and avoid perfectionist ambitions-by economists who insist that private decision makers universally do and should maximize?
A general search for safeguards uncovers many possible alternatives to rules. One small forward step might be an agreement by the executive branch, the Federal Reserve, and the Congress on a regular annual dialogue focusing on a set of fiscal and monetary indicators that would describe the stance of stabilization policy. Such a discussion might help to highlight the relevant issue: What deviations of those indicators from their historical average positions are appropriate in light of the state of private demand and the target for prospective economic activity?
The indicatots of fiscal and monetary settings would serve as guides in judging the appropriateness of policy. As Warren Smith pointed out, indicators are only a way to characterize policy, and the basic need is to formulate and carry it out properly rather than merely to characterize it properly.52 Nevertheless, I believe that accepted indicators can serve a useful function in providing a context in which to evaluate-defend and criticize-a set of policy choices.
I have previously suggested, as a political safeguard, the creation of a bipartisan board of economic experts, separate from the administration, and authorized to speak out on policy issues involving technical results or widespread professional agreement.53 A body with some official designation could have more authority and impact whenever it could muster an overwhelming agreement than does the troupe of unorganized, however distinguished, members of the profession who testify individually to congressional committees. I have no illusions about the range and frequency with which bipartisan agreement would be obtained within the profession. But I believe that the majority of disinterested private economists, representing a wide range of methodology and ideology, would have been appropriately critical of administration policies and programs both in early 1966 and early 1971. Moreover, the very existence of such a board in those periods might have exerted a disciplinary influence on the internal discussions and debates that led to the inappropriate fiscal programs.
Even more important, reforms of legislative procedures could help to ensure greater responsiveness of fiscal policy to the right signals and greater insulation from the wrong pressures. Such reforms would include establishing a reliable mechanism for prompt congressional verdicts on presi- dential tax proposals; extending the scope of formula flexibility recently initiated in extended unemployment insurance benefits and the public service jobs program (some important experiments in rules with feedback); and creating more opportunities for reliance on temporary, self-limiting, and self-terminating provisions.54 In summary, the best strategy for stabilization policy, and for political procedures to safeguard stabilization objectives, remains a major challenge that takes us beyond our present knowledge. But rules for fixed instrument settings would not achieve our objectives. On the contrary, it would be a rare coincidence for the same full employment surplus or the same rate of monetary growth (or the same interest rates) to be appropriate two years in a row. The proponents of rules have raised important issues; they have provided good questions and bad answers. In this paper, I have tried to highlight and interpret their good questions and to sort out the issues they raise in both the economic and political areas, in an effort to facilitate the search for the good answers. 7. In deciding on adjustments in his intended money path, the policy maker acts as though the covariance among the coefficients on money (mO . . m4) is zero.1 Also, he views the m and e coefficients on federal expenditures as uncorrelated.
Exercise
After charting his course for a year ahead, the policy maker waits a quarter, observes GNP for that quarter zero, and thenlooks ahead four more quarters. Suppose that, in quarter zero, the price equation worked with no error, but GNP deviated from its expected and target value by some amount, u.
Just to illustrate, suppose Yo was below Yo by $5 billion; u =-5. (All the instrument calculations that follow are proportional to u and all incremental loss calculations are proportional to u2. The choice of this particular illustration does not influence the nature of the results; a u of +5 would simply reverse the direction, while the absolutely smaller negative u of -2.5 would cut the instrument moves in half and the incremental losses by three-fourths.)
The policy maker is about to rechart his course for the next four quarters. The target path is unaltered, and the expected changes in Y for a given money path are unaltered, but the expected level of Y is lower by $5 billion for each subsequent quarter, assuming that M is kept on its initially planned path.
With no response in altering M, the expected loss for the subsequent four quarters is E(L) =4 (5)2 + 147.50 = 247.50.
The incremental loss associated with the deviation in quarter zero is 100 (see Tables A-2 With expectedfull adjustment, the policy maker acts as though he were in the activist's paradise, resetting M relative to its intended path to make Y equal to Y* for each subsequent quarter. This is better than no response; it cuts the incremental loss to 59.23. The full 100 of loss from expected deviations is saved, but the policy maker pays heavily for the added Brainardtype variance created by the large swings in M from its initial path, which was assumed to minimize variance.
1. In fact, the prevailing covariance is negative; the square of the standard error of F2m, is less than the sum of squares of the standard errors of (mo ... m4). In my judgment, the simplifying assumptions specified at the outset lean over backwards, on balance, in favor of inaction. First, ignoring the small amount of positive serial correlation of residuals makes the no-response pattern look somewhat better; it does not penalize inaction for the probability that a downward deviation in A Y in one quarter will be followed by a downward deviation in A Y in the subsequent quarter. Second, ignoring the negative covariance among the money multipliers makes a small shift (like horizon adjustment) seem more risky than it really is; on the other hand, it underestimates the variance associated with policy strategies (like expected full adjustment) that adjust M in opposite directions during successive quarters. Third, omitting any possibility of using federal expenditures as a policy tool cuts down the optimal activism. Most important, ignoring the opportunity to shift the money path subsequently in light of any deviations in Y observed in quarters one, two, and three overstates the expected loss for any activist strategy. Finally, cutting off the horizon after four quarters underestimates the cost of inaction; it could also understate the cost of instrument changes if a major overhang of added (or reduced) money remained at the end of the four quarters, requiring a neutralizing action in the fifth quarter; but none of the activist strategies leaves a significant overhang.
To be sure, the choice of nominal GNP as the unchanging target has a slight tendency to overstate the cost of inaction. It would be more realistic to take an unchanged target path of real GNP. But since price flexibility works very slowly in the price equations of the St. Louis model, the simplification has only a minor distorting effect. Inaction would leave expected real GNP at the end of four quarters down by about $4.8 billion of the total $5 billion drop in expected nominal GNP. In addition, the calculations above are true to the spirit of St. Louis by ignoring social costs of instability in interest rates.
Horizon adjustment is obviously an overly conservative policy strategy; it avoids any expected reversal of policy or "oversteering." Yet it does come reasonably close to optimality in the exercise. The result suggests that, if a St. Louis man wants to live by a simple rule, he can improve substantially on the rule of steady money growth by adopting the following feedback rule: Always deviate from a steady growth money path by creating enough additional money in this quarter to make up ultimately for last quarter's deviation between the actual and desired growth of GNP.
Or he can frame the rule in terms of growth rates. According to horizon adjustment, the initially intended growth rate of money for this quarter should be adjusted by adding it to any shortfall (or subtracting from it any overshoot) in last quarter's GNP below (or above) its desired rate. Thus if the annual growth of GNP last quarter was, in fact, 5 percent when the target growth was 8 percent, the annual rate of money growth for the current quarter should be marked up by 3 percent from the previously intended rate.
Comments and Discussion
David I. Fand: Arthur Okun's "Fiscal-Monetary Activism: Some Analytical Issues" probes and clarifies some of the analytical differences between those who favor an activist macroeconomic policy and those who favor rules or guidelines. Several dimensions of the activism-guidelines discussion in the past four decades are reviewed in this paper. The first is the rules versus authorities issue, which was first raised by Henry Simons during the depths of the Great Depression in the 1930s and which focuses on the relative merits of automatic and discretionary policies. The second concerns the independence of the central bank and the relative powers of the monetary and the political authorities-an aspect of the activism issue that emerged from the studies of the Joint Economic Committee in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The third is the fine-tuning issue that emerged in the 1960s and that centered on the reliability of the forecasts derived from the large-scale econometric models. Fourth and finally, there is the issue surrounding the decision theory approach to optimal policy, which has been receiving increasing attention in the last decade. Okun's analysis of these aspects is perceptive and his stimulating discussion directs attention to the important issues.
Okun argues persuasively that the discussion of activism versus guidelines (or rules) centers on the strategy and tactics of stabilization policy, while the discussion of monetarism versus fiscalism focuses on the content of stabilization policy. The fact that activist fiscalism was challenged by guideline monetarism in the 1960s was, in my opinion, something of a historical happenstance. The heyday of monetary fine tuning was in the 1920s, and the stabilization dialogue in the last decade was, in effect, between middle-aged monetarism and youthful fiscalism. Ultimately the implementation strategies associated with monetarism and fiscalism will, I believe, 164 tend to converge more and more, so that a monetarist-fiscalist substantive dichotomy will coincide less and less with an activist-guideline tactical dichotomy. Okun develops the arguments in favor of activism, and his thoughtful analysis will find acceptance by many who do not share his policy views. The emphasis and language in his paper inevitably reflect his partiality to activism. Those who favor a guideline approach would presumably emphasize different matters. To illustrate, consider Okun's section on "The Issue of Self-correction." Advocates of rules or guidelines would emphasize the relative stability of private demand rather than the self-correcting feature of the system. They assume that the private economy is reasonably stable, and would remain so in the absence of severe policy shocks. Another example is the term "activist's paradise"; a proponent of rules or guidelines would probably stress the need to avoid purgatory.
Guidelines should be defended not on the grounds that they incorporate all the necessary knowledge, but rather that they will, in our current state of knowledge (or ignorance), give us a reasonably good result on the average. Rules or guidelines are therefore to be thought of as a temporary solution, since the possibility always exists that someone may find a better one. Activism, on the other hand, suggests a license to innovate, depending on the circumstances. Guidelines are therefore a conservative strategy, relying on relatively well-defined procedures, while activism is more open-ended, relying on the policy maker's ability to develop effective measures for particular disturbances.
Rules or guidelines are rationalized on the grounds that the best is often the enemy of the good: Rules are not viewed as a means to achieve the best result, but rather as a procedure that will give a reasonably good result on the average. This view is related to Okun's analogy of guidelines with a "constitutional" limitation on the flexibility of fiscal and monetary policy.
The stability or instability of the private economy is an important issue separating those who favor guidelines from those who favor activism. Guideline supporters assume that the need for policy to stabilize the government may be greater than the need for government to stabilize private demand. They do not deny that private demand may at times fluctuate. What they fear is that activism in pursuit of the best outcome may produce inferior results. There may be a genuine difference here in the interpretation of history between those who favor guidelines and those who favor activism.
A second important difference reflects their respective aspiration levels, and follows the distinction between the best and the good. Those who favor guidelines may be willing to settle for a system that will give a relatively good result on the average because they have somewhat lower aspirations than those who favor activism. Alternatively, some may choose activism precisely because they have higher aspirations; they aim for a result that is considered outside the attainable range by those who favor rules. The idea that the private economy is reasonably stable and the acceptance of lower aspirations appear to be characteristic of those who support guidelines. Yet one may ask why, if the private economy is reasonably stable, should a guideline orientation necessarily be associated with lower aspirations? To explain this apparent paradox it may be useful to distinguish three kinds of macroeconomic problems: those that result from bad aggregate demand policy, those that are frictional in nature, and those that reflect chronic tendencies. Unemployment or inflation due to bad monetaryfiscal policy is an example of the first case; unemployment or inflation due to rapid changes in demand, in technology, and in resource allocationsuch as Charles Schultze's sectoral inflation case-represent the frictional problem; and a tendency for money wages to rise faster than productivity, characterized by high rates of unemployment and inflation such as we now associate with a sloping Phillips curve, may be an example of the. chronic problem. Those who favor rules or guidelines believe they will achieve a better result with respect to the first problem, but are pessimistic and therefore willing to accept imperfect results for the second two cases. They believe that an activist policy will not help the Phillips curve problem in the long run and may not help very much with respect to the frictional problem.
One final point: A factor often cited in support of rules or guidelinesindeed, sometimes viewed as one of the strongest arguments-is their hypothesized effect on expectations. Lloyd Mints, in discussing alternative stabilization policies, would rank them on the extent to which they would tend to stabilize private expectations.1 On this view, a crucial argument for a guideline policy is that it would generate such stabilizing expectations in the private economy.
Okun's excellent paper focuses attention on the activist-guideline approaches to macroeconomic policy. His analysis will motivate and help the reader to analyze these alternative postures and will stimulate further discussion of this important policy issue. The ensuing dialogue should help il-luminate one factor responsible for fundamental differences in stabilization policy.
William Brainard: This paper serves a very useful purpose in clarifying the various analytical considerations involved in debates about stabilization strategy and in illuminating the relevance to those debates of lags, uncertainty, and costs of adjustment. Okun focuses much of his discussion on rules versus discretion. The relevant question, of course, is, what is optimal policy-not, if we had to choose, whether we would prefer doing nothing to attempting to stay continuously on target by adjusting our instruments second by second in response to each new bit of information about the economy. Okun does an excellent job of identifying and analyzing the various considerations that tend to make optimal policy, in a particular situation, more or less activist. The debate about how much discretion is optimal can never be settled in the abstract. I found it both surprising and informative to see how activist optimal policy turns out to be in the St. Louis model, even taking into account the lags in response and the uncertainty about the estimated coefficients in its regression equations. I would tend to be more conservative; I would want to double the estimated standard errors in anybody's model, even my own. The spirit of many of Okun's remarks is less activist than the calculated optimum in the exercise shown in his appendix.
Some critics seem to assume that the only objective of the Federal Reserve is the stabilization of GNP. They see the Federal Reserve as behaving like the monkey in the psychology experiment who always gets the round pegs in the square holes, even though randomness and ignorance would lead to the correct action half the time. I would like to reinforce Okun's insistence that the actual historical behavior of the Federal Reserve should not be regarded simply as systematically perverse. If the Federal Reserve appears perverse, it is not because it takes or rejects the advice of certain economists, but because it has a particular perception of the economy's workings and because it is concerned with a variety of objectives. Many economists felt that the Federal Reserve was overly concerned in 1966 about the health of savings and loan associations and of the homebuilding industry at the expense of the GNP target. Okun makes an important point in stressing the need to be explicit about nonstabilization objectives in establishing or evaluating stabilization policies.
I wish Okun had given more time and more attention to the possibilities of designing new instruments or altering existing ones so that policy could be more effective. How can we design instruments with shorter lags that would make us less dependent on long-run forecasts of the economy? How can we design instruments with reliable effects and with low costs of adjustment? A particularly challenging problem is to design instruments that provide strong incentives and yet avoid the adverse anticipatory effects that, as Okun points out, can be associated with enacting and removing such fiscal devices as the investment tax credit. One interesting question is whether the Scandinavian scheme of storing up pools of liquidity during booms and activating them during recessions safeguards against such effects. Okun correctly points out that, so long as instruments are not perfectly correlated, it is optimal to use a combination of instruments, or "policy packages," even if we are pursuing a single objective. In any reduced form equation, sample estimates of the response coefficients of fiscal and monetary policies are likely to show a negative correlation of errors, since the policies have most often been used in the same direction to accomplish either stimulus or restraint. Such sample correlations warn us that we cannot be sure how to allocate stimulative or restrictive effects between fiscal and monetary policy, and it suggests that anyone who overestimates the impact of one tool is likely to be underestimating the impact of the other. In this connection, it would have been interesting if Okun had put government expenditures to work in his calculations on the St. Louis model. Even though the cumulative impact of changing federal expenditures is small in that model, substantial reductions in expected loss might be obtained by using the fiscal tool as well as the monetary one.
On the other hand, there are a priori reasons for believing that the actual impacts are positively correlated-that when private demand is likely to be very sensitive to fiscal action, it will also be sensitive to monetary action. If the world does have that characteristic, the packaging of fiscal and monetary instruments buys less insurance than appears to be the case. Although it is possible to estimate the mean and variance of the impact multipliers in a random coefficients model, I do not know how one would go about estimating the correlation between multipliers in such a model.
Other considerations, moreover, modify the case for packaging policy instruments. When the impact of a particular policy instrument is likely to be correlated with the impact of the shock that policy is trying to offset, use of the instrument may be especially desirable. Such a situation emerges in Okun's example of a decrease in plant and equipment spending that has a negative, but uncertain, effect on consumption. A fiscal stimulus that has a similar initial effect on aggregate demand will be subject to the same consumption uncertainties, but they will be offsetting. Similar considerations apply to shocks in the financial markets. An activist monetary policy is particularly desirable to offset shifts in liquidity preference because the impact of the policy is likely to be similar to that from the disturbance, even though, as in the investment example, both effects may be unknown. In this sense, there are asymmetries between fiscal and monetary policy.
I agree with Okun that the instrument for monetary policy does not have to be perfectly controlled by the monetary authority. What is important is that it should not bounce around in response to systematic feedbacks from the real sector; that, of course, is the objection to the use of interest rates as an instrument. But I would go further than Okun and argue that a precise definition of the monetary instrument is not crucial in an activist strategy.
Obviously, a precise definition of the instrument is important to a rules proponent. The interest rate that is going to be fixed must be specified if the Federal Reserve is operating as it did prior to the accord of 1951, and the money concept must be explicitly defined if some fixed growth of "money" is intended. But for an activist, it is not important to decide precisely what handle is to be turned as long as decisions on policy are frequently reviewed. The key decision is how to respond in light of new information about the strength of demand for goods and for financial assets. It is extremely difficult in the very short run to interpret errors in the forecast of interest rates or monetary aggregates. That difficulty creates serious problems, but none of them is solved by an attachment to one indicator rather than another as the direct handle for managing monetary policy.
General Discussion
Leonall Andersen commented on Okun's application of the St. Louis model. He stated that the appropriate course of action in response to any shortfall or overshoot in GNP depended on the type of shock accounting for the deviation. Andersen noted three kinds of shocks: (1) purely random over time; (2) a structural change; and (3) a single shock with effects that could last a long time. Andersen suggested that everyone would agree that policy should not be altered in response to the first type of shock, and should be changed in response to the second type. The third case remained doubtful; with the desirability of action depending on the time horizon of the impact and the urgency of returning to the target path. He concluded that further discussion and investigation of these three types of shocks could be fruitful.
Robert Solow, however, underlined Okun's point that on average the disturbances in the St. Louis model were random in first differences. They represent a random walk that starts off from wherever the economy happens to be. The first type of shock that Andersen mentioned would imply randomness in levels, and the model did not reveal such a process.
Several participants commented on the interrelationship between forecasting accuracy and policy strategy. Lawrence Klein felt that the analysis by Theil that Okun developed tended to downplay forecasting accuracy to an extreme degree. Klein stressed that nothing helps the policy maker as much as being right. In some situations, the ability to diagnose the true state of the economy has a major impact on the kind of policy action that can be recommended and, indeed, on whether any action can be reasonably recommended at all. Such a situation prevailed in the fourth quarter of 1970, when the General Motors work stoppage created a quandary as to the true state of the economy. Martin Bailey urged that serious attention be given to the issue of whether forecasts are biased. At turning points in economic fluctuations, forecasters tend to lag behind, showing a systematic bias that would impair an activist strategy. Bailey felt that the treatment of forecast accuracy was one of the very few instances in which the paper did not do justice to the case in favor of rules.
Saul Hymans and James Duesenberry also felt that uncertainty about the direction of the economy's movement was more serious than uncertainties about the speed of movement. In Duesenberry's view, reversing the direction of instruments imposed a particularly high cost, and this cost would interact with forecast uncertainty to call for a little less activism than Okun had indicated. For example, if GNP was below target and policy was expansionary, forecast errors that required additional boosts by policy probably would have less serious consequences than errors that overshot the mark and forced a reversal of policy toward restraint. Under such circumstances, increased confidence in the forecast of the level of activity would encourage the policy maker to make larger shifts in the instruments.
Duesenberry felt that Okun's paper was valuable in identifying issues that could be productively discussed and debated, so that economists could disagree on specifics rather than by drawing pictures of totally different worlds. He saw the possibility of a convergence of views, presenting the choice of more or less reliance on activism rather than all or none. A proponent of rules who conceded some uncertainty about the appropriate level of the full employment surplus or the appropriate growth of money, and who was willing to learn from experience, might often agree with an activist who was particularly pessimistic about his accuracy in estimating private demand and multipliers, and who was particularly concerned about instrument costs. William Poole also urged that the issues be viewed as matters of degree. He felt that the proper questions were what rules, how much discretion, and who should have the authority for discretionary decisions. Poole noted, for example, that Congress had granted far more discretion to the Federal Reserve over monetary policy than it had to the executive branch with respect to fiscal policy. Some reorientation in both of these areas might make good sense, Poole concluded.
In the context of locating middle ground between activists and rule proponents, Fand felt that strategies of rules-within-bands-like the initial formulation of the Committee for Economic Development-were more promising than the paper indicated. Rules proponents feared that, with no constraints, activists would be trigger-happy, whereas activists feared that rules proponents would fall asleep at the switch. An agreement to use discretion outside of some band might be a feasible compromise, according to Fand. Okun, however, expressed greater willingness to compromise by scaling down the size of instrument movements rather than by reducing their frequency. He reiterated his concern that the strategy of rules-withinbands might produce the worst of both worlds.
Martin Bailey argued that the irrationality of government was a larger problem than Okun had conceded. On some occasions, an administration may forgo opportunities to improve existing legislation because it fears that Congress would add undesirable provisions, bringing on the so-called "Christmas tree effect." Similarly, even though rational professional policy makers could, on occasions, improve fiscal and monetary settings, their programs may be distorted by a Christmas tree effect from others pursuing different objectives, contrary to the public interest. The federal decisionmaking process is separated and spread across a conglomerate that is not subject to the rationality assumptions that economists attribute to individuals or firms. Solow felt, however, that the very irrational elements that Bailey stressed made rules a "nonstarter." Because of its decision-making processes, the government would be most unlikely to stick with any rule.
Indeed, Solow wondered whether, in criticizing the rules position, Okun had taken it too seriously as a genuine contender for stabilization strategy. Robert Hall shared this misgiving; he viewed the position of rules proponents as basically a philosophical stance that all social action is likely to be perverse and hence that it should be minimized and, ideally, eliminated.
